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Income Distribution and Optimal Growth:
The Case of Open Unemployment*
INTRODUCTION
Normative questions relating to income equity have long dominated any
discussion of income distribution~

Of late, however, economists have focussed

considerable attention on the relationship of incoL, dispersion to general
efficiency of resource
issues have been raised.

allocation, e.g., [6], [11), and [15].

Two main

The first is the factor opportunity cost effect.

It is contended that altering income dispersion in a specific direction will
increase the output share of commodities with low factor opportunity costs.
The demand for goods which are intense in the relatively abundant factors will
rise and the demand for goods which are intense in the relatively scarce factors
will decrease.

The second issue concerns the belief that income distribution

affects import demands.

To the extent that a change in income dispersion will

reduce aggregate import demand, the scarcity value of a limited supply of for•
eign exchange will be decreased. 1
In addition to these t~-Jo effects, there is the argument that a more
even distribution of income causes a decline in the aggregate savings rate
and thereby retards growth.

This link between income distribution and economic

growth is more controversial than the others.

It depends entirely on a change

in the demand for capital goods, whereas the foreign-exchange and factor
opportunity•cost effects include this and other changes in demand composition.
*We would like to thank Professors Kenneth J. Arrow and Richard A.
Brecher for invaluable comments and criticism.
1For empirical
evidence on these two effects in Latin American
countries, see Cline [6].
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The association of income distribution with the rate of capit.sl formation is
based on the assumption that the household marginal propensity to save varies
with either the level or kind of income earned.

These are points of considerable

empirical and theoretical disagreement, as indicated in [7], [G], and [9].
Moreover, even if the marginal propensity to save did vary in the hypothesized
manner, a reduction in private savings due to income equalization could be
offset by increases in tax revenues and public savings.

Under these conditions,

a reduced dispersion of income will cause the socic1l cost of savirigs to increase

only if (a)

government and private consumption are imperfect substitutes in

their contribution to social welfare and (b)

a chanze in the public-private

consumption brec1kdmm is necessary to keep c1ggrec;.:!te savings constant.
For these re2sons, the purpose of this paper is confined to analyzing
the factor opportunity cost [Ind foreign exchange effects of income distribution.
The possibility of income distribution influencing the soci2l cost of savings
is examined in a companion paper [ 16].

The model ,·,e present attempts to fill

a significant vacuum in th2 existing literature on the relationship of income
distribution to econo~ic 3rowth, which includes [10]. [17], and [2~.

This

literature genernlly involves closed economy models '1-Jbich assume full employ•
ment 1

Further, it is the distribution of income by !~ind (e.g., relative factor

shares), rather than level, which affects output composition and capital
formation in these models.

Our model, built upon a foundation of conventional

theory, represents a si3nificant departure from growth literature in these
areas,

The closed econor,1y assumption is abandoned, and the static relationships

are derived ns a simple extension of the type of neoclassical trade model
described by Kemp

[12].

The analysis is undertaken in the context of labor

surplus economies where redistribution appears to be a particularly crucial
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policy objective.

Open unemployment is produced in the system by assuming that

there is an institutionally-determ ined floor on the minimum real wage.

With

this constraint binding, investigation is made of the output and employment
effects of changes in the composition of demand.

These changes are induced by

varying the dispersion of household expenditure.
These are static considerations.

Dynamic elements are introduced into

the model by equations determining capital accumula, :m and the change in
capital dispersion over time.

Our thesis is that the time paths of the capital

distribution is more effectively controlled through income taxation than it is
through other policies affecting factor payments such as import tariffs.
Therefore, the coefficients of the household tax function make up the policy
instruments in the model.
The optimal gro,-,th problem consists of maximizin 6 an integral of in
staneous welfare subject to two dynamic equations snd initial and terminal con
ditions on the capital-11:,bor ratio and the distribution of capital.

We assume

that the main basis for differences income among households is differences
in the amount of capital m-med.

For this reason, commodity demands are im•

plicit functions of capital dispersion, and the problem is designed to provide
direct insight into the optimal trajectory of the standard deviation of the dis
tribution of capital.

Once this trajectory has been determined, aloni; with

that· of the income tnx schedule and the capital lnbor ratio, inferences may be

drawn about changes in the standard deviation of disposable income.

For

reasons of simplicity, the term capital refers in most cases only to land and
human capital; however, in analyzing our final results, we do consider the
effect of modifying the definition to include human capita~~
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The contributions of this paper are the following:
(i)
(ti)

(iii)

De consider income dispersion by household
rather than by income classes.
We make no restrictions on the precise form
of the income distribution
other than
it possess finite first and second moments~
~e are able to determine, under fairly
~eneral conditions, the consumption optimal
growth paths of the distribution of the
capital labor ratio, the employment rate, GDP
per laborer, and the standard deviation of
dispos2.ble income per laborer.

In section I, a static model is described, along with the effects of
ch~nges in the standard deviation of the distribution of capital and the
capital•labor ratio on re2l income and employment.

In section II, this static

formulation is incorporated into a dynamic optimi~ation model.

Section III

provides the derivation of first-order conditions and an appraisal of their
policy implications.

The l<'.st section discusses the e:~tension of the analysis.

I.

la

THE STATIC MODEL

Commodity demand functions and savings
Denote consumption per laborer of the jth household by cj, capital per

laborer by kj, and

income per laborer

deflated by the commodity 1 price index.)

(All variables are

Then the function determining the

consumption• labor ratio of the j th household may be ,;,Jri tten ns
(1.1)

This function is consistent ·oith a number of theories of consumption behavior.

If it is assumed that the ratio of real cash balances to capital assets re
mains constant, then the relationship is similar to one proposed by Tobin [17]

-5which makes

consu□ption

proportionDl to real wealth.

If, on the other hand,

individual households s,we in order to maintain a fL,ed ratio of capital

assets to normal income, then, ;iven no .'Jdjustment lag, a may be interpreted
as the product of the reciprocal of this r.'Jtio and the marginal propensity
v!age

to consume out of normal income.

completely to consump!:ion e~;:penditure.

income is untaxed and allocated

This assuu:ption

may be easily relaxed

without qualitatively affecting our results, provided that the tax rate on
wage income is conste.nt.
By subtractin~ consumption per laborer from tot,!l household income

per laborer, 1•1e obtain the function
(L 2)

s·)

~

- TD

yt

--

-l-

~

,.,'"'j
Q

cj

kj

where sj is savings per 18'.,orer of the jth householci. and yj is disposable
D

capital income per laborer of the jth household,

(both deflated by the

Denote 2ggregate domestic st:vings per laborer by

commodity 1 price inde2'.).

s, disposable capital income per laborer by y , Dnd capital intensity by k.
0
Then taking the expected vc1lue of (1. 2) yields the aEgregate savings function
(1. 3)

s = Yn -

a k

For the sake of simplicity, net foreign capital inflm-1 (which may be easily
incorporated by addin8 an intercept) is set equal to zero and the relationship
(1.4)

=

i

s

where i is gross investment per laborer, is assumed to hold as an identity.
We assume that there are two commodities, labelled 1 and 2.

The impact

of capital dispersion on economic variables in our t,w-zood model depends cri
tically· on the form of the commodity demand functions.

The function deter

mining private consumption per laborer of commodity i mny be written as

(1. 5)

c.

1.

=

c.

1.

(c, Ge' P)
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where cr

C

is the standard deviation of distribution of household consumption

per laborer, and Pis the ratio of the price of good 2 to the price of good 1.
An exact derivation of this function exists in the case of a quadratic demand

1
.
f unction.

Suppose that the household demand function has the for~

(1. 6)

where the j superscripts designate the value of consumption per laborer of
the jth household.

As

Klein [ lL:-] has shown, takin:::, expected values of this

expression yields
(1. 7)

By substitutin 6 the expression for private consumption per laborer,
(1. 5) we obtain

into the commodity demand function,
(1. 8)

Consumption per laborer is a lineor function of

,;,J

and k, and every household

Therefore,

is assumed to face the same wage rate.

0
C

may be obtained from

the variance-co-variance matri:.,~ of the bivariate distribution for the capital-

In the case vJhere capital is defined

labor ratio and the emrloyLlent rate.

to include human capital, the employment of particular household may well be
an increasing function of its capital-labor ratio; s~illed laborers not only
tend to get laid off after unskilled laborers but they are also in a position

1
The aggregate commodity demand function may also be derived from a
·q.
household demand function o~ the for1'.1 li.
c.J = A. (cJ) 1.c (P) 1.p
l.

l

where the exponents represent partial elasticities, ,-ihich
In this case, the form of the distribution of expenditure
restricted to be log normal. It can be shown that, under
the function determinin3 the aggregate value of c 1 may be
C.

j-12

A.
1.

l

(c/

1

ic (P)-~ip

where

CJ

µ =

i1.
lC

(il.
'

l.C

-

1) (

_s/
C

are assumed constant.
per laborer must be
these assumptions,
written as
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to bump unskilled laborers.

In this situation, ,-Je uould expect the variance

of the employment rate to be increasinr; functions of the variance of capital.
Clearly, the higher the a~gregate employment rate, the less significance
this effect will have.
With this reasoning in mind, the function for the standard deviation
of private consumption per laborer can be written as
(1. 9)

where

o
c/l.

C

e

=

</>

(e, o)

< 0, ~-0 > 0

'

and ct,

Ge

< O

Throughout much of the subsequent analysis, howev8r, \·Je shall consider only
the simple case vihere cc1pi tal does not include human capital and wage income
per laborer is uniformally distributed.

Since the expression for consumption

per laborer is linear ink, we h~ve
(1. 11)

Under these conditions, the corn:r.odity c2cmand function

may be viritten in the

form
(1. 11)

C •
1.

=

C • 11
1.

( ,., ,

k, p ,

0)

Aggregate Output and Ernplovment
The static part of the system is summarized by functions relating the
aggregate employment rate and gross domestic product per laborer to the aggre
gate capital-labor ratio and

2

measure of capital dispersion.

These functions

represent the reduced form solution of a general equilibrium trade model.
In the version of the trade model presented here, two factors, capital
and labor, are considered, as \vell as two commodities.

It is assumed that the

real wage expressed in terms of the labor intensive commodity remains constant
at an exogenously-specified minimum and that the home country is incompletely

apecialized.
·\.,,:'

Brecher [3, pp. 32-5] has demonstrated that under these conditions,
I

the home offer curve is of the st~aight-line Ricardian variety (in the region
of incomplete specialization),

1

This curve is represented by the line segment

l\ A A u in Figure 1, ,-1hereas the foreign offer curve, which has a conven
1 2 2

tional shape, is represented by OF.

The intersection at point S gives the

equilibrium level of imports and exports<

(Commodity 2 is assumed to be the

exportable and commodity 1 the import-competing good.)

The equilibrium produc

tion point is shown tc, be point D in Figure 2, ,1hich is part of the straight

With the real wcJge (expressed in terms of

line transformntion surface.

commodity 2) held fixed, ,-Je know by the Stolper··Samuelson theorem [ 18] that
the slope of the commodity price line remaiPs constant, provided that there is
incomplete specialization

Th2 Engel curve corresponding to the constant

commodity price ratio and " S')eci£ied "fllt:e for the standard deviation of the
distribution of ~apital, a'; is depleted as r

1

r

2

in Figure 2.

(The derivation

of this curve from c:;;nmc,sity demand functions j_s discussed in the Appendix.)

The offe~ trian~le

DHd

gi·Jing the equilibrium levels of imports and

exports is constructed ±rorr, a price linr: p-p which intersects the transformation
surface at the equilibrium production point, D, and the Engel curve at point d.
The dimensions of this triangle corresponds to those of the triangle OSJ
shown in the offer curve diagram (Figure 1).
The rigid wage transformation surface, corresponding to the familiar
Rybszynski line in trade theory, is made up of the locus of tangencies between
the price line and the production possibility curves.

2

(The latter are based

1
See also Brecher [9, Part I, Section C].
2The production possibilities curves are based on the assumption that
the sector i production function is of the form
:~ l =° F

F

i
F

•'-.

i

(K . , L . )

1.

> OJ •Tei T

1.

> 0

~i
1.
where X. is output, K. i:: r.apital Dn<l L. is employed labor in sector i. These
functio~s are presumeJ to be homcgenous1.of degree 1 is capital and labor and
strictly quasi-concaves, For a cict[:iled derivation of the transformation sur
face from the production possibility curves, see Brecher [3, pp. 6-30].

Figur e 1
Commodity 2 - (labo r-inte nsive )
[Home Expor ts and.F oreig n Impor ts]
F

1•

..

l..~.r

·,'_i

I

Commodity 1 (capi tal-in tensi ve)
[Home Expo rts and Forei gn Impor ts]
.

,, /
1/ /
//

,;;' /
/.

j-•
\

J

r. { Commo.di ty 1 (capi tal- inten sive)

'. }[Home _Impo rts and For~i gn Expor ts]

/

.
,,/

p/
~

Commodity 2 (labo r-inte nsive )
[Home Impor ts· and Forei gn Expor ts]

I

'°
I
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(capital-intensive)

\
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on the conventional 2ssumption of flexible factor prices.)

Each production

possibility curve corresponds to a different level of employment; the full
Since commodity 2 is assumed

employment curve is depicted by T T2 in Figure 2.
1

to have a lower capital-labor ratio than commodity 1 at all sets of factor

prices, movements alon~ the transformation surface from R1 to R2 correspond
to increases in both employment and constant-price GDP.

Now consider a decline in the standard deviation of the distribution
If we assume that the partial derivative of the
1
.
\,_Wit~- r:_spect,_t~~commodity 1 (2) demand funcl:i.on'v;1.s pos1.t1.ve (negative), then such an

of capital from cr• to cr".

equalization of capital holdings will cause the Engel curve to shift to the
left.

The level of ,;.-,a::;e income consistent with a fixed level of commodity 1

demand 'I.sill increase, ·uherc,ss the demand for commodity 2 will rise at all
levels of wage income.

If domestic production is held constant at point Don

the transformation su:cface, the dimtnsions of the offer triangle will clrnnge
from DHd to DZN in Fi,<;;ure 2.
of good 2 exports.

This change implies a reduction in the quantity

Consequently, there will be.a dise~uilibrium in international

markets, since the point on the home offer curve,

s',

corresponding to the

new offer triangle, DZN, will not intersect the foreign offer curve in
Figure 1.

Brecher has sh01m that such an excess demand for an exportable

which is relatively labor intense will be cleared by increased domestic pro
duction of that commodity [ 3].

This takes the form of

D

leftward movement along

the transformntion surface from D to a ne,,, equilibrium point D', implying an
increase in both constant-price GDP nnd employment.
By solving such a system we may derive expressions for GDP per laborer
(y) and the ernployraent rate (e) ,,Jhich take the form
(1. 12)

(:i..13)

y

-12-

where
k = capital-labor ratio
a= standard deviation of the distribution of capital
i-J

2

=

exogenously- specified real wage

The partial derivatives of (1.12) are linear transforms of those of (1.13).
Denote the real rental rate on capital (expressed in terms of commodity 1)
by r •
1

Then the expression for the value of GDP per laborer (expressed in

terms of commodity 1) may be written as. 1
(1.14)

y

= wl e + rl

k

-

wl = p w2

where
and
Since P and r

2

rl

=

r2 p

are unL;uely determined by w

2

specialization), this is

a

(in the rer;ion of incomplete

linear function in e and k with constant coefficients.

From this result, it follo,,s immediately that

>
a as oa
o
-< o

(L 15)

and
For this reason, the effect of changes in the standard deviation of
the distribution of capital on the employment rate is_ of particular interest
to us.

This effect depends on the sign of the partial derivative of the de

mand function for the import-competing good with respect to the standard
deviation of the distribution of expenditure.

In the Appendix, it is shown that

in the region of incomplete specialization

>

(1.16)

g
0-

z

as

oc1

~

<

>0

C

1 rt makes no difference which commodity price index is used to deflate
GDP. Relative commodity prices are fixed, and the units of measurement may
be chosen so as to make P equal unity without loss of generality.

-13.

That is to say, ¥educing (increasing) capital dispersion ,,ill cause the em
ployment rate to increase (decrease) if and only if the aggregate demand for
commodity 1 per laborer is an increasing (decreasin~) function of the standard
deviation of expenditure per laborer.

Recall the relationship between the

aggregate (1. 7) and the household demand function (1. 6)"

From this, it is

clear that the qualitative effect of changes in capital dispersion on the
employment rate is critically r~lated to the properties of the household demand
functions for commodity 1.

In particular when this function is quadratic, the

sign of the partial derivative of the aggregate demand function with respect
to

CJ

C

will be the same as the sign of the second partial derivative of the

household demand functic-::i for commodity 1 with respect to expenditure per
laborer.
The foreign exchange effec~ of a change in

CJ

is neutral in the sense

that condition (1, l 'j) 'Uill hold even if the labor intensive good (commodity 2)
is imported provided that the home country remains incompletely specialized.
Under these conditions, the slope of the terms of trade line p-p in Figure 1
jill not change; therefore, it is clear that the equilibrium exchange rate,
1
which represents che opp0rtuni ty co st of foreign e:-::chan 6 e ,~il 1 he constant. (The
international price of the importable and the domestic price of the exportable
are assumed to be fixed.)
The social rate of retu=n on capital, fk' does not equal the private
rate of return on capital, r -.
1
flected in r

1

An increase in k has a direct effect on y re

and an in<lirec~ 2ffect resulticg from its influence 6n the

--------------

.
. l'i zed in
. comp 1 ete 1y specie
· not ~.ru2 i'f t.h e 'come country is
· 1.s
l This
domestic
the
conunodity 1. In this case the foreign offer curve OFt intersects

offer curve ,"lonG the segment u A1 in Figure 1, and movements in the home
1
offer curve induced by ch2nges 1.n O' will c1ffect the terms of trade. When an
increase in a causes P to fall; as is the case ~,;hen the offer curve moves from
u1 1 A1 1 A2 ' UJ' ::o :J, ,; 1 A2 2 the. wege r ~t_2 exp:'es sed in. terms of commodity 1
will fall" Tiiese chaEges are associated w1.tL an increase 1.n employment and
a decline in the ::: :;::o~·::,.mi ''=Y cost of fo~ei;n e::changeo

- i4--

employment r.:,te.

In the appendix, ue de:cive necessery and sufficient condi

tions for

which imply that
(1. H,)

fk > r l' fkk < 0, and f 00 < 0

A positive value for the Hessian determinant of (1.13), when combined with

the above conditions on the second partials of this function, implies that
(1.12) and (1. 13) are strictly concave,.

Assumin;:; the household demand func

tion has the quadratic form discussed earlier, the Hessian of (1.12) will
always be positive if gklc and g00 are both negative.

These conditions on

the second partials of (l,i3) require that the second expenditure partial of
the household demand function for good 1, and hence

oc 1/cP,

be positive.

But, if this r2c;uirement is met., then by (L 16)
(LE;

< 0

g0

fa < 0..

---·---~

Strict concavity not o:1ly confine:.:; us tc +:he case ,vhere equalization of capital
holdings increases output and 1=mployment; it also violates a necessary condi
tion for f (k,o) to hc2ve an interior 1uaximum.
legitimate for us to consider
and

CJ

E'.

It is still, however, perfectly

-:::o:-:n'"r maximum where condition (1.19) is met

is determined by its lower boundo

Consequently, our dynamic analysis

will be confined to the case where~ and hence fa are negative for all
feasible values of k and a.
lL

THE DYNAMIC MODEL

Thus far, ,-Je have shown thr: direction of influence of k and
per laborer and the employment rate.

CJ

on GDP

Jut this analysis, pertaining only to

a static situation does not provide insight into the mechanism by which
changes in k and a ·:: al~e place ove;: time.

More specifically, intemporal

-15-

relationships bet,,;,een these variables and the policy instruments designed to
influence them remain to be formulated.

The Dynamics
The net change in the capital-labor ratio of the individual household
is determined by its gross savin~ per laborer less the change in the capital
·to;
labor ratio due·: ·depreciation and population growth alone. Consequently,
since household savin3 per laborer is given by (1.2) and fixed rates of
depreciation and population growth are c:ssumed, ue may 1;.,rite
(2. 1)

i) =

yjD - ia
·,

+ n +

6 )kj

,-ihere kj is the time derivative of kj, . n is the r.ste of population 3rowth, and
6 is the rate of depreciation.

Denote taxes net of subsidies levied on the j-th household by NTjJ_
j

and capital income per laborer Gross of taxes by y ,_.

Now as

"
(2. 2)

we have
(2. 3)

One possible tax function is
(2. 4)

NTj = a"
0

+ a"1 (yjK

NTj = a"

+ a" • r

-

yk)

which can be ·oritten as

(2.5)

0

1

1

• (kj - k)

The coefficient a" determines the revenue impact of the tax and the coefficient
0

ai

determines the re-distributive effect of the tax.

into (2.3) yields
(2. 6)
8

Let a

= ....2
0

rl

II

and

Substituting (2.5)

-16-

then

using
k~ E (kj)

(2. 7)

k

~

E (kj)

and
(2. 9)

• 6 1
J.
d
J.
CT = -CT E (k - k) • dt (k - k)

(2. 10)

k = rl (k -a )
0

we have

(2. 11)

.

CT =

-

rl (1 - a 1 )

We define the control variable u

(Ci

CT -

2

+ n + 6)

k

(CL+ n+ 0) CT

by the equation

(2, 12)

The other control variable is given by the relationship
a"
0
(2 13)
ao = ul =

½

0

Note that u

1

is only

E.

pseudo-·conti:-ol variable.

of the net tax function (Le., ,

In fact, it is the intercept

the expected net tm: ;;:

11

0

)

which the government

controls, not its capitalized valueThe complete dynamics are then
(2. 14)
(2. 15)

. = r (k - u ) - (a + n + 6)
.0 = [rll u - 1(CL+ n + O)]CT
k

k

2

These differential equations are characterized by the lack of any assumption
regarding the underlying distribution function beyond its having finite first
and second moments.
The form of equation (2.15) indicates that the time path of

only on u •
2

CT

depends

OtheL poiicies €ff2cting the employment rate (e.g., an export

subsidy) will not influence the time path of CT provided that the parameters of
the net tax and savings functions ~re unchanged.

At this point, it is impor

tant to note that (2, lLi-) ,::nd (2. 15) are derived under the assumption of zero

-17-

marginal propensity to save out wage income, together with the uniform
distribution of human capital (which is excluded from total capital).

The

•
a equation is still valid under the assumption of a non-zero marginal propensity
to save out of wage income, provided that this income is evenly distributed.
Alternatively, we could assume that human capital is included in total capital
and that wage income is unevenly distributed due to variation in the employ
ment rate.

Under these circumstances, it is legitimate to assume that the

marginal propensity to save out of unskilled i-,age income is zero and equation
(2.15) remains intact.

(The effects of combining human and physical capital

are considered in further detail in section III.)
The Criterion Function
Denote consumption (public and private) per laborer by c, and the total
labor force by L.

Instantaneous ,.elfare,

u,

is given by the function

(2,lE,) U =Lu (c)

The function u(c) cetermines ciggregate utility per laborer.

Since the commodity

price ratio is fixed, private consumption (expressed in terms of commodity 1)
may be treated as a single iood.

It is assumed that public and private con•

sumption expenditure 2re perfect substitutes yielding identical marginal
benefits to the households.
The possible effects of changes in expenditure distribution on social
welfare are not taken into account in this function.

The inclusion of a

C

as well as c in the social ,,elfare function could be justified on the basis
that the social welfare function represents an aggregation of individual
utility functions.

But this approach involves the usual pitfalls associated

with cardinal utility and the assumption that utility is divisible [ 13].

-lEFurther, a precise aggregztion of household utility functions would require
that moments of the exper.diture distribution higher than the second be included
in the social welfare function.

1

Finally, the only simple alternative to the

utility aggregation approach··- a preference ordering for c and a

C

obtained

by voting--seems to have equal, if not greater, defects [2].
The justification for the simple welfare function (2.16) goes beyond
the fact that a more general function may be difficult to derive or analytically
intractable.

When concentrating on the efficiency aspects of capital and in

come re-distribution, it seems reasonable to assume that distributional con
siderations by themselves do not influence social choice.

2

The criterion fanl~tion itself may be written as
T
(2. I 7)

(
\

T

--

-y t

,,

e

u (c) dt =

0

,,-

-pt

\ e
0

e

nt

Lo u(e) dt

where p is the rate of sociEl discount, n is the rate of population growth,

Y

is the discount rate net of population growth, Tis the planning horizon,

and Lo is the initid labor force.

Thus the paths of optimal capital accumula

tion and distribution are given by the solutions of the following optimal
control problem:
U (c) dt

(2. 18)
0

1
The appearance of the second moment alone is justified only in the
case where the household utility function is quadratic. Contrary to the
assumptions of our model, the demand functions implied by such a utility
function are linear in expenditure.
2

In the special case \,here lump- sum transfers of consumer goods can
be effected, an increase inc may be interpreted as making everyone better
off.
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where
(2.19)

.=

(2.20)

[r

CT

1

u

2

-

(Cl'

+

n

+

6)] CT

and the constraints
(2.21)

k > 0,

CT _::

(2.22)

0 < u

<

0
(r l - Cl)

k

1-

(2. 23)

\

The upper bound on u

1

reflects the fact that gross investment per

laborer cannot be less than zero.

The constraints on u

2

indicate politically -

determined upper and lower bounds on the re-distribu tion coefficient of the
tax function.

Illa

EQUILIBRIUM GRm-JTH PATHS

The above optimal control problem is linear in the controls u

1

and u ;
2

thus the optimal policies 1•Jill be of the "b~mg-singu lar-bang" type [5, pp. 261-65],
i.e., the controls will move between their boundary values and an interior value
(s) correspondi ng to the sinGular are (s).
We shall consider only the case where for nll feasible values of k
c1nd u

since in the other cases the function f (k, O) is not concave.

It will now

be shown that this first partial derivative of this function with respect to
O'

will be negative in the case of a steady-stat e optimum only if o is equal

to its lower bound.
Suppose that an interior maximum exists.
co;:-respondi ng to k 2nd

CT

:)y :>..:c and

;\.CT

Denote the cost ate -,.,ariab les

respectivel y.

Then, on the singular arc,

~.hen Hu ~ G, the necessary condi tionslor optimc:lity are derived from a
Hamiltonian of the form
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H = e-vt [U (c) + A1_

(3. 1)

,\.

i:

+ A,.,.
V

a]

The form of this function indicates that the costate variables may be inter
preted as the imputed values (shadm1 prices) of increases in k and
in terms of utility.

O,

measured

Froc (3.1), ~e derive

(3. 2)

H

=

0

-. u
C

=

0

=

=

u

ul

(3. 3)

H

(3.4)

-A,

u2

.

r

- rl

1

)'!,;_

rl o A o

and

-,,

(3. 5)

K

C

(f

k

= Uc ( f:(5 )

0

+ G') + Ak (r 1

- rl

-

\

0

(Cc+ n

-

Q'

-

n -

()

- y)

+ () + Y)

In addition, we have the dynamics ,,hich are given by equations (2.14) and

. .-

(2.15).

In equilibriu m, k =(3, 6)

0

ul =

I1

I

Ak = I\. CJ =
~G'

.,

;_ __ ~

o.

This gives
+ n + 0) i
k
rl

and
(3. 7)

Since r

1

u

2

= --

and o are positive, the shade,, price
(3. 8)

\

(3. 9)

I\.

0

o:c

o is given by -

= 0

also,
k

= uC

The two remaining variab.les are k

and o.

These can be obtained from (3. ~-)

and (3.5) giving
(3~ 10)

fk

(3~ 11)

fa (k, o) = 0

(k, cr) = n

+ o+y

As long as n and 6 are non-negat ive, the upper-bou nd on u

be exceeded at the equilibriu m point.
tion on u

1

1

> n + 6 +

will not

To insure that the lower-bou nd restric

is met, the inequalit y
r

2

Q'

> 0

-21must hold. 1

This also implies that the steady- state equilibr ium value of u
2
,·1ill be positive but less •:l1cm one. Such an intervd may ,,1~11 represen t the
limits of politica l accnpta bility.

It means that the t2x will have some re

distribu tive effect, but preclude s an income- distribu tion reversa l, (i.e.,
an inverse relation ship bet,1een pre- t2.x and after-ta, ~ income).

Le c:ssurue

th~t open unemploy ment e~ists 2long the optim2l tr2jecto ry; otherwis e, (1.12)
v,Ould be 2 discondn uo;_;s function .and thereby violc:;te the regul2r ity cclld1tio
ns
of the optimal control probleLl, If the full-emp loyment constra int is never
binding , conditio n (3.10) will be met either if
(a)

commodi ty 2 is sufficie ntly inferior at the equilibr ium
?

point to make gk (k, cr) negative ,·- oi if
(b)

the inequ2l ity

holds.
y >

Tbe l.Jtter conditio n implies that
C'

and that the net marginal product of capital in the pri
vate sector (r

1

- 6) be less then the social rate of

d}_scoun t. Since conditio n ('.::. 1 :.) c.:nmot hold,
This leaves us only 1-1ith a boundary maximum.

.<:in

interior maximum is impossib le.
It cDn be shown that as t

approach es infinity , a vill approach its lower bound along the optimal trajec
tory and k \·Ji 11 be determin ed oy the modified r:;ol den rule conditio n (]. 11 C).
That there is an asympto tic turnpike associat ed with these values of k and a

1A

·
.
. in
negative
. t12t
l
. means tat
u may not 'oe unrea 1 istic
h
it
a steac
1
state optimum um be att.:iined only if there ore "forced savings. " If the u,uuel
is modified to include positive net foreign capital inflmJ; the above condi
tion is sufficie nt but not necessar y for u to be non-neg ative.
1
2
see appendix for the relation ship between inferior ity and the sign
of 3k (k, a).
3
1eland [22] has shown that, with a certain type of risk aversion ,
.there will be a precauti onary demand for s2vings. His worl: indicate s that it
is possible to hc]ve posit:i.ve savinss when the househo ld, as t,ell as the social,
rate of time preferen ce is less than the net private returns on capital.
Further, even after allm ing for a reasona'. Jle risL: premium , this return may be
high relative to the rate of time of preferen ce of individu ol foreigm lenders.
1
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Note that the e,!uation determining

may Le demonstrated ~·.s follm-.1s.

CJ

may be

integrated directly as

d,.,

~ =

[r

CJ

and r

1

1

u

2

is assumed tote const2nt.

zero, then u

2

-

u -

u -

O] dt

Integration indicate that if

CJ

approaches

approaches nezative infinity provided that the time horizon is

less than infinite.

But

Ur,
L.

is bounded from below by B.

Therefore, a must

approach zero asymptotically.
By comparinz the asymptotic turnpike vc1lues of k and a with the initial
conditions, the direction of change of these varia~les along the optimal tra
Initial and steady- stnte optimal values of GDP

jectory may be estnblished.

per laborer and the ewployment rate may also be calculated from (3.10)
and the lower bound on
for

deter □ inin;

Q.

As

yet, however, we have not presented a method

the standard deviation of the distribution of income.

The standard de?iation of the distribut ion of disposabl e income per
labbrer (O ) , in a stec1dy-- state equi librL.1m is a linear function of cr.

For,

y

from (L 25), we see that the total disposabl e income (,,,hich is the sum of
income from capital y 0 , and wage income w) is given by
Total disposabl e income= r • k + w

Expected net tax.

Then, noting ::he fact that wage income per laborer is uniformal ly distribut ed,
we see that

0- 12)

cr

y

=

(1 -

a ) cr r
1
1

Then, from (3. 7) _,
~3- 13)

cr

y

= (n

+ 6 + a) cr

The directirJn o::: mover,1en..: of key <:arget varinbles in the model along
the optimal trajector y is illustrate d in Figure 3.

Level curves are plotted

represent ing the different combinati ons of k and a ,•ihich will yield the values
of the employmen t rate, GDP per laborer, and tbe standard deviation of int/

come per laborer existing Et the equilibriu m point

Since the values of cr

are plotted on the verticcil axis ,md the values of k on the horizonta l axis,
the curve correspon ding to the equilibriu m cr y is a horizonta l line vv' coin

..

(Here it is assumed that the lower bound

ciding with the horizonta l axis,for cr

y

is zero.)

laborer, yy:,

The curve correspon ding the equilibriu m value of GDP per

~learly has a steeper slope than the one correspon ding to the

,

equilibriu m employmen t rate, ~e·~.

!.f the initial values of k and cr are in

1

The slope of the level curve for equilibriu m GDP per laborer is
given by the expressio n
do/dk = ··
The absolute vabe of the right hacid side of this expressio n is greater than
the ratio gk/ go. This ratio equals the ab solute value of the slope of the
level curve correspon dinc to a constant employmen t rate,
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region I, whicl, lies above the yy 1 curve, then both GDP per lc?borer and the
employment rate will increase as the equilibriu2 point is approached.
values of k and o

which lie bet\·Jeen the two curves in region II

Initial

represent

a case in which there is a decline in GDP per laborer and an increase in the
This is attributable to a de

employment rate alon8 the optimal trajectory.
cline in the capital labor ratio which has
than it does on the employment rate.

a

greater effect on GDP per laborer

If the initial values of k and o lie

in region III, then both GDP per laborer and the employment rate will decline
along the optimal trajectory.
DefininG capital to include human capital does not alter the qualitative features of the optimd :::;rm-7th tr2jectory a great deal.
conditions, it is no lon~_er legitim2te to tissume thet
rate is independent of i~s car)ital-l2bor ratio.

a

Under these

household's employment

As 2lready noted in Section I,

the variance and co-variance p&raraeters of the biv~ri2te distribution of

the capital-laLo::.--rc.t:'..c-,

.<,nd

th: e,nployr:,ent rate depend

on c·

and e.

and the same return on capital, r 11 the standard deviation of the distribution
of income per laborer is determined by the parameters of this distribution
and

Consequently, o

ta •

2

is an implicit function of0 and e, and we may write

y

(3.14) oy = / (o, e, u2)

In steady-state equilibrium we have
(3. 15) a

since u

2

;, r'J,,

y

(a, e)

may be taken as a constant.

Because the employment advantage of

a household with a high relative capital- labor ratio diminishes with an increase in e,
e

<

0

and

,J/ a

*

> o. 1

1For empiric2l evidence of an inverse relationship between income dis
persion and the aggregate employment rate) see Schultz [21].
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Given that the first p2rti2ls of these functions have the s2me sign as those
derived in Section I, for the case of incomplete specialization, then (3.15)
may be written as
(3. Hi)

a y --

't**

(a, k)

where

Yi*CJ > o

j"ki:

k

< 0
This curve is no

The vv' curve in this case is shown in Figure 4.
longer perfectly horizontal, as it was in the .case ,-,here
alone.

Instead, it now has a positive slope.

CJ

y depended on o

If the initial values of k and o

lie belm-J this curve, in re2;ion IV, the standard deviation_ of the distribution
of income will increase don;; the optimc:il tr2jectory even though o declines.
In all the other regions, ho~:ever, the dispersion measures ,,ill change in the
same direction.

IV.

CONCLUSION::;

In this paper, we have developed (1) a static model shmJing the re
lationship between the distribution of the capital labor ratio, the aggregate
employment rate and GDP per laborer; and (2) a system of dynamic equations
determining the inter-temporal behavior of the capital distribution.

Under

certain conditions, we have derived the consumption optimal long run behavior
of this distribution, the output and employment variables, and a measure of the
dispersion of per-capita disposable income.

In this section, we examine

some of the implications of our results in greater detail.
1.

The optimal 6rm-1th problem is restricted to the good-things

coming-together

case ,-,here GDP per laborer

and the

employment

rc1te

-26are decreas ing functio ns of the standar d deviati on of the capital -labor
ratio, a.

Under i:hese conditi ons, a 2sympt otically approac hes its lower bound

along the optima l traject ory.

The optimal traject ories of k and a are uni

quely-d etermin ed by the fir st- order conditi on only in this boundar y-ma::im
um
situati on.

Noneth eless 7 it is still possib le to examine alterna tive time

paths even if output and employm ent are increas ing functio ns (or indepen
dent)
of a.

While optimi zation presen ts difficu lties in this case we may deter
7

mine the k and a traject ories as~oci:a ted·.wii th given instrum ent paths,
from
the dynamic equatio ns 7 (2.10) and (2.11).

From these traject ories 7 the effect

of specifi ed changes in the parame ters of the net tax functio n on
such target
variab les as the ~rr.ployme~1t

::::ate 1

income distrib ution and consum ption may be

analyze d.
2.

It may be argued that the

objecti ves involvi ng these variabl es

ldll be achieve d b; t:a:~es 2nd rubsidi es on foreign trade as \•Jell as
income
taxatio n. 1

Assumin g that t:he ~etzle r paradox conditi ons do not hold, a tariff

reducti on (or export subsidy ) will shift the offer curve to the left
and increas e
the output share of the exporta ble commod ity.

See [3, Chapte r 8] and [,:':, Part 4],

With k and a conatan t 7 this change will increas e the employm ent rate
and GDP
(measur ed at constan t domest ic prices) .

Howeve r 7 even though commer cial

policy has the same effect on these variabl es as a change in

0

the impact on

income distrib ution and GDP fl'!easured at ,-mrld prices may be conside
rably dif
ferent.

From (3.14) and (3.15); it is clear that a effects income distrib ution

directl y as well as through its influen ce on the employm ent rate.

By contra st,

tariff policy can decreas e the standar d deviati on of the distrib ution
of income
1
Anothe r possib le c:ltern ative to income ta;rntio n is the wage subsidy
.
Howeve r, given ::hat this is an effecti ve policy instrum ent, it is
not clear
why open unemplo yment should exist at all.

-27only in the case where his p2rarneter depends on the er.1ployment rate,
it has no effect.

Othen-1ise,

A tc::riff reduction (or export subsidy) unlike a change in

a will ahiays cause the terms of trade to shift ai;,dnst the home country;
For these

hence, its effect on GDP measured at world prices is ambiguous.

reasons a combination of capital re-distribu tion and tariff policies may be
warranted when the employment rate is a decreasing function of a.

In this

case, it may be desirable to improve the terms of trade short of the st8ndard
optimal tariff point or at least use tariff policy to prevent
terms of trade change.
could be offset by

l

highly adverse

The resulting decline or 12d: of grmvth in employment

increc:sin:3 the re·-distribu tion coefficient of the income

tax function and there;:iy dec::,:-easing

G,

Of course, if the employment rate

is an increasing fucction of c, alterations in the distributio n of capital per
laborer cannot be used to increase the flexibility of tariff policy, without
conflicting withe goal of zreater equity.
3.

Our model mr.y be e8sily modified to include the effects of once

and- for-all chan 6 es in production function parameters.

These changes are parti•

cularly important in the c~se i;Jhere the lower bound on o is positive
due, say, to some persons 0eing uneducable.

Under these conditions, the para

meter variations ,-1ill have a si3nificant impact on the long-run optimal income
distributio n.

This impact may well be considerably different from that obtained

by comparative static analysis ,-lith k and a constant.

For example, such

analysis indicates that, under certain conditions, a Hicks-neutr al productivit y

1

standard optimal tariff theory, e.g., Kemp [12, pp. 296-363], is
not applieble, in this case since it is based on the cssumption of full em
ployment.

increase in the cDpital-intensive sector will
decline [3, chapter VI].
of income.

c2use the employment rate to

Gi'1en (3.IL:-), this implies

a

more uneven distrfoution

On the other hand, the asymptotic turnpi~e values of these

variables may change in the opposite direction if the increase in produc
tivity (and hence r
of k.

1

and w ) is associated with a rise in the optimal value
1

.Appendix
Notation:
P = the ratio of the price of commodity 2 to the price of commodity 1.
H. =
1.

the real uage (expressed in terms of commodity i)

r. = rent2l r.c!te on cnpital (expressed in terms of coranodity i)
1.

w

= wnge income per lc1borer expressed in terms of comrr,odi ty 1.

e

= the employment rate

k

= the capital labor ratio

a

= the stand2rd deviation 0£ the capital lnoor ratio

'propensi~)
Mlc = the mar2;inal\to consume commodity 1 out of total expenditure.
Ble = the first comraodi~y 1 s share in the general expansion of output
due solely to

c.::1

i~crease in the employment rate

Blk == the first commodity's shDrE: in the gener.::il expansion of output
due sa:el; to ~n incrense in the capit2l labor ratio
1-1

lee

=

th(; second p2rticJ. deri·:2tive of t1.1e cor..r.1odity l de'.Tland function
witL respect tc pri·,ate consutTption IJccr laborer.

Mlcm = the secoad par ti cl derivative of the commodity 1 demand function
with respect to a
= the cross partinl derivative of the ccrnrnodity

L

with respect to c and cr.
= the specified labor force in the home country

L*

=

1 demand function

th~ specified labor force in the rest of the world.

Final demand per laborer is equal to the sum of private consumption
(c), public consumption (g), and private investment (i) per laborer.
the latter two components are assumed ~o affect only commodity 1,

1

Since

and the

relationship

1This assumption ~ay be relnxed.

Alloc2ting 2 fixed proportion of
(g + i) to a non-trnded ~oods sector (including construction and government
services) will n~t ch~nge our quElit2tive results.

(A,l)
holds, the functions deterr.1ining final demand per laborer in the two sectors
may be written in the form

(A.2)

y

1

=

C

1

(k

"

(k

Y2 =c "
2

'

(J

'
CJ

'

'
w

'

p)

Sectoral final demands per laborer aTe implicit function of the employment
/\

rate,

since w is given by

(A.4)
With p, k, and~ held constant, y

1

is uniquely determined by y

2

through the

employment rate variaLle; l1ence, the modified Engel curve, shown in Figure 2
of the text, mc1y be dE:rived,.
Recall tha-:: :ommodity 1 is ,_ssumed to be the import-competin g good.
The output of this csmmcdity per l::il)orer, x , depends on the commodity price

1

ratio, the employm-.::.nt rc1te:, 1:1.n-i --~.he -:.:1pit2l .. labor rc:tio,

Net imports of

commodity 1 per laLorer: z , are given by the expTession

1

(A. S)

-

C

1

II

By substituting the expression for w int0 this relationship, we obtain

The balance of payments condition may be written as

(A.7)
where the function z/< (p) determines the rest of the ,vorld' s net imports of
commodity 2 per laborer.

1

1

·. his genera!_)
This formulation is 2 simple extension of Kemp I s [ 12, chapter--Z.]ancf \ approach. to comparative static analysis applies here. We have retained his
assumptions and notation as much as possible.

It can be shown that the endogenous variables in this equation will be unaffected by labor force grouth, provided that the ratio of L* to L remains
fi;ced.
By differenti2tin3 this e2:pression totally, ·iie obt.2in expressions
for the partial derivatives of the employment rate with respect to k and a:
(.A. 8)

(A.))

a M
where z =

-:-

le

r

1

Consequently, provided thc::t the margin2l propensity to consume comrrodity 1
out of total expendituye i'ilc'

is

non-negative ,:,;it less than unity, the par

tial derivative of the e,,1ployment rate ,vith respect to the capital-labor
ratio (oe/ok) will be positive.

since

(Hl c - B

le

1

Moreover, given this type of non-inferiority,

) is ne._,1Jtive.

The higher order p.::rtid derivE.tives take the :form
-[(/M

(A. 1 O)

(A.11)

,2
o e

ok
(A.12)

aa

=

!j

-

w

1

a M

lee

r

1

(z - B k)]

- [ aH lea L - w1 H lea r 1 ( z - B k
1

- [M1oa

2/- e

--::50 2

lee

=

6 - wl (Ml cC)

1

)l

i·\a l

"2

Ll

If the household demand function is auadratic in expenditure, the cross
partial derivative 1-1

1 ca

uill be zero.

See (l.G).

This implies that the

?

cross partial derivative a~e/ak ao ~ill be zero.

Conse~uently, if the co-

efficient for squared e~:pendi ture in the household demccnd function is positive,
1

rt can be shmm that ;:. in equ2tion (A. G) is less than one if and only
if Mlc is less than one, and Kem~ [12, p. 110] has pro~en that

B, _ > 1 £1nd B
< C•
... l~
1e
uhen commodity 1 is rel<"ti·;ely capital intensive.

then the Hessian for the function determining the employment rate will t>e
negative definite.

and M ,...,~ ~ill both be positive ....
The second partials M
lee
1vv

and therefore

2

Further, given that o e/okocr =
(A.14)

o,

the condition

2
2
(o c/ok )

> 0

will hold.
These conditions ,-1il 1 not hold at a point where
(A, 15)

oe/ocr

=

o

and M
10

=

o

In the case of the quadratic demand function described, such zero partials
imply

At this point, the value of cr ,-1hich maximizes the employment rate is not
unique, since the Hessian vanishes when the first-order condition (A.15)
is met.
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